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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This IS an appeal from a conviction and sentence for two COLInts of aiding and abetting 
first degree murder. I.e. §§ 18-4001, 18-4003(a), and 18-204. R 383, 387. The convictions in 
this case should be reversed because the jury was not properly instructed that Mr. Reid could 
only be convicted if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that he acted with premeditation. The 
convictions should also be reversed because of the admission of certain photographs at trial. In 
the altemative, the sentence should be vacated because it was based upon unreliable evidence. 
B. Procedural History 
Appellant. Corey Reid, was charged by information \vith two counts of aiding and 
abetting first degree murder in connection with the deaths of Neil Howard and Cindy Bewick. 
1011 Kienholz, Jr.. was the principal. R 78 - 79. Mr. Reid \vas comicted and sentenced to a term 
of life WIth .~O years fixed. R') . This appeal timely foIl(mcd. R 387. 
C. Statement of Facts 
On August 8, 2008. Virgil Testky, who was picking berries at Dobson Pass, discovered 
the body of Mr. Howard. When he returned with law enforcement. they also found Ms. Bewick's 
body. Tr. p. 224, In. 19 - p. 226, Ill. 16. 
Jon Kienholz pled guilty to the first degree murder of Mr. Howard and Ms. Bewick. Tr. 
p. 470, In. I - 10. Per his own testimony, he initially lied to la\v enforcement. Tr. p. 470, In. 20-
22. Later, he told the state, ''I'll testify to whatever you want." Following that statement, he 
testified against Mr. Reid in order to avoid the death penalty. Tr. p. 650, In. 21 - p. 651, In.IS. 
Mr. Kienholz testified that he had recently retumed to Idaho following a stint in the army 
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wherein he received extensive firearms traming. Tr. p. 363, In. 6 - 16. According to Mr. 
Kienholz, he and Mr Reid were longtime friends and they, along with Mr. Reid's girlfriend, 
Kristin Purtill, and Mr. Howard and Ms. Bewick (who were also in a relationship and had a 
young son together), were planning to go to Bolivia. Mr. Kienholz intended to make a living 
there by selling illegal substances. The plan was very disorganized, but the group had decided to 
use Mr. Howard's car for transportation. Tr. p. 364, In. 4 - p. 370, In. 16. 
Early in the morning on the day that would end with Mr. Kienholz killing Mr. Howard 
and Ms. Bewick, he borrowed Mr. Howard's car. He then picked up Mr. Reid and Ms. Purtill. 
Tr. p. , In. 13 - p. 376, In. 6. They all then picked up Braecyn Wood and drove to Coeur 
d' Alene and later to Spokane. Tr. p. 376, In. 14 - 15. Along the way, items were pavmed and 
marijuana was purchased. Everyone in tile car was smoking the marijuana. Tr. p. 378, In. 24 - p. 
380, In. 4. 
Accord, to 1'\/11'. Kienlwll. during the drive, rvlr. Ki('nholl called Luke Hill and offered 
to trade him drugs for the lise of his gUll. Mr. Kienholz dropped everyone off and ,vent to get the 
gUll. When he returned. he vvas showing off vvith the gun and he testified that Mr. Reid smiled 
and laughed. Tr. p .. 181. In. I - p. 385, In. 12. 
Everyone next drove to Daryl Bewick's house where Mr. Howard and Ms. Bewick were. 
When they arrived there, Mr. Howard and Ms. Bewick told Mr. Kienholz that Ms. Purtill was 
trying to turn them in on outstanding warrants. Mr. Kienholz testified that he told Mr. Reid 
about this and Mr. Reid became angry. Tr. p. 394, In. 10 - p. 395, In. 8. 
At that time, according to Mr. Kienholz's testimony, he told Mr. Reid and Ms. Purtill that 
he could ';snuff the problem out." He also told Mr. Howard and Ms. Bewick not to worry 
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because he did not think that "there was any \-veight behind their assumption," Tr. p. 395, In. 19 
Everyone then got ITl Mr. Howard's car and drove to Silverton. The two couples, Mr. 
Howard and Ms. Bewick. and Mr. Reid and Ms. Pm1ill, were not speaking. They drove toward 
Wayne Barrett's house where, after dropping everyone off at a field, Mr. Kienholz went to get 
ammunition for the gun. Mr. Kienholz also picked up a pair of mechanic's gloves which he wore 
for the rest of the day. 1'1. p. 397, In. I - p. 400, In. 20. 
Following that, Mr. Kienholz got everyone from the field and they drove up to Dobson 
Pass. There was again, according to Mr. Kienholz' s testimony, a lot of animosity in the air. 
Once at the pass, they went to a campsite and built a rire. Mr. Kienholz made people work 
together on this, apparently in an eff0l1 to make peace. Tr. p. 402, In. 1 - p. 404, In. 16. 
According to 1'vlr. Kienholz's testimony, after a \\hile. he suggested that he and Mr. Reid 
leave the others at the campsite. When he did this. Mr. Howard told Ms. Bewick to get his knife 
and this made ,,"1s. Purtill resistant to being len behind vvith them. So, only Mr. Howard and lVls. 
Bewick were left at the camp. Tr. p. 408. In. 12 - p. 409, In. 25. 
Mr. Kiellholz testified that he told !vIr. Reid about the knife and Mr. Reid became irate 
and said, ;'We have to kill them." Tr. p. 410, In. 13 - p. 411, In. 16. 
The three drove from the camp to Mr. Wood's house, where they dropped off Ms. Purtill 
and met Mr. Reid's cousin, Hiram Wilson. Mr. Kienholz did not know Mr. Wilson, but Mr. 
Reid told him that Mr. Wilson should be allowed to come along because he was "down for 
anything" and also because he had just received money for his birthday. Tr. p. 411, In. 20 - p. 
413, In. 23. 
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Mr. Kienholz agreed to taking Mr. Wilson along, and he drove Mr. Wilson and Mr. Reid 
to Mr. Wilson's siSler's house for Mr. Wilson to get his birthday money. According to 1\11'. 
Kienholz, during the drive, Mr. Reid "briefed" Mr. Wilson, telling him that they were going to 
kill Mr. Howard and Ms. Be\vick. However, Mr. Wilson did not appear to believe that Mr. Reid 
was serious. Tr. 414. In. p. 416, In. 4. 
Mr. Kienholz, in his initial contacts with the police, refened to Mr. Reid and Mr. Wilson 
as his soldiers. He also freely told Mr. Wilson and Mr. Wood that he had previously killed 
someone in Thailand with his bare hands and bragged about getting away with it. He testified 
that he had planned to murder other people besides Mr. Howard and Ms. Bewick saying, "but I 
don't know who hasn't [made such plans]," and gave as an example of prior plans that he had 
planned to murder an ex-gJrlfriend. He also told IY'lL Wilson, prior to murdering Mr. Howard and 
Ms. Be,vick, that he had been planning a murder for years. but he just did not kll()\\' who he was 
going to murder ami who he \\ as gOlllg to commit the murder \\ Ith. 0Jolletheless. Mr. Kicllholz 
testified that he \\as shocked II1tO silence when he heard lVlr. Reid say that they were going to kill 
Mr. HO\vard and Ms. Be\vick. Tr. p. 416. In. 4 - 12, p. 471, In 8 - ~5, p. 640, In. 5 - 15, p. 672, 
In. I - p. 673, In. 20, p. ()89. In. 1 - p. 691, In. 8. 
Mr. Kienholz testified that after learning of the plan to ki II, Mr. Wi Ison asked to see the 
gun and Mr. Reid told him where it was. Mr. Wilson got the gun from the trunk by pulling down 
the back seat, and passed It to both Mr. Reid and Mr. Kienholz. The gun was unloaded. Tr. p. 
418, In. 3 - p. 419, In. 15. Mr. Kienholz testified that it was just getting dark and they were 
driving to Dobson Pass to commit the crime. The gun was put back in the trunk and the plans 
were not further discussed. Tr. p. 420, In. 1 - 18. 
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At the top of the pass, Mr. Kienholz decided to park the car. Mr. Reid had wanted him to 
continue to the campsite, but Mr. Kienholz vetoed the idea. They all got out of the car, and Mr. 
Kienholz told Mr. Wilson to get the gun while Mr. Reid got the ammunition. Tr. p. 420, In. 18 -
p. 421, In. 23. 
According to Mr. Kienholz, Mr. Reid the box of ammunition from the glove box and 
removed the individual rounds and handed them to Mr. Kienholz. Mr. Kienholz loaded the gun 
and placed it in the small of his back. Mr. Wilson lent Mr. Kienholz a shirt that covered up the 
gun. Tr. p, In.2 - p. 424, In. 15. 
According to Mr. Kienholz, the group then walked to the campsite, while Mr. Wilson and 
Mr. Kienholz planned out the tactics. But, when they got near the campsite, Mr. Reid suggested 
that they just walk up and get it over vvith. Tr. p. 426, In. 3 - 20. 
According to Mr. Kienholz, he just did not know vvhat to do, and he kept tellmg himself 
that he could defuse the entire situation. But. at the same time, he was bound by a promise he 
had made to protect Mr. Reid and Ms. Purtill. Tr. p. 426, In. 25 - p. 427, In. 8. 
As they neared the campsite, they saw Mr. Howard, and all three hid in a bush. After a 
while, according to Mr. Kienholz, they walked into the campsite where Mr. Kienholz told Mr. 
Howard a lie about how they had just robbed a gas station. Tr. p. 428, In. 21 - p. 431, In. 19. 
Mr. Kienholz told everyone to stay and focus on the campfire. While they were focusing, 
Mr. Kienholz engaged Mr. Howard in conversation asking him to repeatedly guess what was 
ironic about the fire. It was at this time that Mr. Kienholz decided that he would not be able to 
stop the murders. According to Mr. Kienholz, he looked to Mr. Reid hoping he would have the 
strength to stop it, but Mr. Reid silently mouthed, "Come on, do it." In response, Mr. Kienholz 
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immediately shot Mr. Howard in the head. Tr. p. 434, In. 7 p. 437, In. 
Mr. Howard fell to the ground, and Ms. Bewick lunged at Mr. Kienholz. Mr. Kienholz 
kicked her in the head and then shot her. Mr. Kienholz can remember her telling him to stop. He 
can also remember Mr. Howard making noises and kicking him to make him stop. Tr. p. 438, In, 
12 p. 441, In. 5. 
Following this, according to Mr. Kienholz, Mr. Wilson took charge and together he and 
Mr. Kienholz drug and threw the bodies off the hi lIside to hide them. During this time, Mr. 
Kienholz put a blanket on the fire, \vhich Mr. Reid told him to take off as it would cause smoke 
and draw attention to them. Tr. p. 442, In. 16 - p. 446, In. 3. 
After this, the three drove to Mr. Wood's hOLlse, where they met Mr. Wood and Ms. 
Put1il!. According to ivlr. Kienholz, Mr. Reid told Ms. PurtilL "We did it." The whole group got 
in the car and began to drive. However. after a bit, Mr. Wood decided he wanted to go home. 
so they drove 11im home. and then the rernaining people drove to Boise. Tr. p. 450, In. 5 - p. 
453, In. 6. 
The group stayed in Boise for a \vhile. During this time, Mr. Kienholz admits he did 
threaten to kill Mr. Reid, hut he believes he immediately apologized and that Mr. Reid \vas not 
afraid of him. Tr. p. 492, In. 4 - 24. 
Mr. Wilson also testified. He, like Mr. Kienholz, had a plea agreement with the state that 
was contingent upon his testimony against Mr. Reid. Tr. p. 575, In. 18 - p. 576, In. 8. The day 
he went with Mr. Kienholz and Mr. Reid \vas the day after his seventeenth birthday. Tr. p. 495, 
In. 25 - p. 496, In. 8. 
His testimony differed from Mr. Kienholz' s. He testified that Mr. Reid told him that day 
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that they \""ere going on a road trip to Mexico and invited him along. Mr. Wilson agreed. 
However. Mr. Kienholz did not want him to come along until he learned that Mr. Wilson had 
some birthday money. Tr. p. 504, In. I - p. 505. In. 9. 
Mr. Kienholz and Mr. Reid drove Mr. Wilson to his sister's house to get the money. Mr. 
Wilson's sister was rationing the money out and initially gave him just $75. Then Mr. Kienholz 
sent him back in and he got another $25. Tr.p.512,ln.1 p.513,ln.ll. 
On the way to Mr. Wilson's sister's house, Mr. Reid and Mr. Kienholz (who was called 
Bubba) told NIr. Wilson that they had a gun in the trunk. Mr. Kienholz told Mr. Wilson how to 
access the trunk and he got the gun out. Then Mr. Kienholz told Mr. Wilson that they were 
going to meet Mr. Howard and Ms. Bewick. and Mr. Reid said that they needed to kill them. T1'. 
p. 508. In. 10 - p. 509. In. 12. Hmvever. M1'. Wilson thought that this was a joke and that they 
were not gOIng to kill anyone. Tr. p. 680. In. 23 p. 681. In. 17. 
On the \\ ay up to the pass. fvlr. Kienhol; said that he might need to pullover and thl'O'v\ 
up because it is not everyday that you kill someone. but Mr. Reid told him that he was a pussy. 
Tr.p.516.1n.5 10. 
1\11'. Wilson testified that on the way to the pass. Mr. Kienholz and M1'. Reid discLlssed 
how they wanted to proceed and that they disagreed ahout where to park. Tr. p. 517, In. 16 23. 
Contrary to Mr. Kienholz. Mr. Wilson helieved that it was M1'. Reid and Mr. Kienholz 
who discussed tactics. not him and Mr. Kienholz. T1'. p. 523. In. 15 p. 524, In. 18. Mr. Wilson 
also believed that after Mr. Reid gave M1'. Kienholz ammunition. he put some extra hullets in his 
pockets in case Mr. Kienholz missed. During the walk from the car to the campsite, Mr. Reid 
suggested that they just steal the car and leave Mr. Howard and Ms. Bewick hehind, as they 
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could not do anything to stop the theft because they could not go to the police given their 
outstanding warrants. Mr. Kienholz did not respond to this suggestion. Tr. p. 519, In. 4 15, p. 
678, In. 20 p. 679. In. 9. 
But, Mr. Wilson agrees that they all wound up hiding in a bush At that point Mr. 
Kienholz wanted to sneak up over a ridge and hide in the bushes and shoot llsing the light of the 
fire. However, Mr. Reid said it ,-,vould be better to just walk into the camp and shoot. Tr. p. 524, 
In. 24 - p. 526. In. 10. 
They ultimately decided to walk into the camp and when they got there, Mr. Reid, Mr. 
Howard, and Mr. Kienholz discussed the plan to go to Mexico. Then, Mr. Kienholz engaged Mr. 
HO\vard in a discLlssion abollt the fire. And, then he finally said that there was going to be a lot of 
fire \vhere Mr. Howard was going and shot Mr. Howard. Tr. p. 533, In. 3 p. 534, In. 16. 
Mr. Kienholz also kicked and shot Ms. Bewick and then shot Mr. Howard again. Tr. p . 
. 'i36, In. 15 21. 
After thIS, Mr. Kienholz ordered Mr. Wilson to help him move the bodies, which he did. 
Tr. p. 540, In. J p. 541, In. 8. 
On cross examination. Mr. Wilson clarified his testimony and explained that up until Mr. 
Kienholz started the conversation with Mr. HO\vard about why a fire is ironic, he did not believe 
that a murder was really planned. He believed that Mr. Kienholz and Mr. Reid were playing 
some kind of sick joke. Tr. p. 580, In. 24 p. 58 I, In. 3. He did not know Mr. Kienholz, but he 
did know Mr. Reid and he simply did not think ~'1r. Reid could do anything like killing someone. 
Tr. p. 678, In. 7 10. Throughout, it was absolutely clear that Mr. Kienholz was the leader. He 
gave orders that Mr. Reid and Mr. Wilson obeyed. Tr. p. 577, In. 23 p. 578, In. 10 
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Further, Mr. Wilson clarified that at the fire, Mr. Reid did not gesture to M1'. Kienholz nor 
did he mouth anything. During that time, Mr. Reid was actually standing behind Mr. Kienholz. 
Tr. p. 579, In. 5 
Mr. Wilson also testified that \vhen the group was in Boise, M1'. Kienholz threatened to 
kill Mr. Reid. He did not appear to be joking and he did not apologize after making the threat. 
Tr. p. 677, In. 4 10. 
After some lime in Boise, Mr. Wilson took the Greyhound Bus hack to his home and 
went to the police. Tr. p. 560, In. 12 20. Mr. Kienholz also made his way back to North Idaho, 
to his mother's, \\'here she took him to the police. Tr. p. 471. In. 1 7. 
Mr. Reid and Ms. PUI1ill remained in Meridian with the car. The police located the car 
and a search \varranl was secured. \Vhen they went to serve the search warrant, Mr. Reid and 
Ms. Purlill cooperated with them and Mr. Reid. upon questioning, told the police that the gun 
from North Idaho was still in thc trunk. T1'. p. S()l). In. 14 p. sn. In. 18. 
In closing. the defense argued that while there was no douht that ~'1r. Kicnholz murdered 
Mr. Hmvarcl and [\-1s. Bewick. the evidence of that murder had to be distinguished from the 
evidencc offered to suppol1 the aiding and abetting charges against M1'. Reid. And, given the 
inconsistencies in the testimony of Mr. Kienholz and Mr. Wilson, and the evidcnce that Mr. 
Kienholz was clearly the leader and rejected Mr. Reid's suggestion that the group just steal the 
car and leave. Mr. Kienholz's and Mr. Wilson's credibility problems, and the need for 
corroboration of accomplice testimony, that the state had not proven Mr. Reid gUilty. In 
particular, the defense focused on the fai lure of the state to prove that M1'. Reid acted with 
premeditation. Tr. p. 724, In. 15 741, In. 6 
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At tbe end of the trial, the jury convicted Mr. Reid of both counts of aiding and abetting. 
Tr. p. 752, In. I 24. 
III. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIE\V 
I. Did the failure to instruct the jury that it must find that Mr. Reid had the mental state 
of premeditation violate the constitutional guarantees of due process and ajury trial? U.S. Const. 
Amend. 5,6, and 14: Idaho Const. alt. 1, ~§ 7 and 13. 
2. Were non-probative yet highly prejudicial photographs erroneously admitted? 
3. Did the district court err in basing the sentence on unreliable evidence'? 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Fai lure to Properlv Instruct the J urv As to Premeditation Requires Reversal 
I. Relevant Facts 
The jury was given the follov,ing instructions: 
Instruction 17 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Count l, Aiding and Abetting First 
fl;: , the statc must e each of folIrming: 
I. On or ahout the 41h day of August. 2008: 
2. In the State of Idaho: 
3. Jon Allen Kienholz, Jf., did without justi fication or excuse, 
4. Willfully, unlawfully, deliberately, and 
5. With malice aforethought and premeditation, 
6. Kill Neil Howard, a human being, and 
7. The Defendant, COREY SKU REID, aided and abetted in the commission of the 
cnme. 
10 
R 
R 323. 
If the State has failed to prove any of the above, then you must find the defendant 
not guilty of murder. If you rind that all the above have been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt then you must find the defendant guilty of murder and decide if 
the defendant is guilty of first murder. 
Instruction 18 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of COllnt 1, Aiding and Abetting First 
Degree Murder, the state must prove each of the following: 
I. On or about the 4th day of August, 2008; 
2. In the State of Idaho; 
3. Jon Allen Kienholz, Jr., did without justification or excuse, 
4. Willfully, unlawfully, deliberately, and 
5. With malice aforethought and premeditation, 
6. Kill Cynthia Bewick, a human being. and 
7. The Defendant. COREY SKlI REID. aided and ahetted in the commission of the 
cnme. 
If the SI:l!'" failed to ~1l1\ (11' the then you must fine! t defendant 
not guilty of murder. If you find that all the above have been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt then you must find the defendant guilty of murder and decide if 
the defendant is guilty of first degree murder. 
Instruction 23 
All persons who participate in a crime either before or during its commission, by 
intentionally aiding, abetting, advising. hiring, counseling, procuring another to 
commit the crime with intent to promote or assist in its commission are gUilty of 
the crime. All such participants are considered principals in the commission of 
the crime. The participation of each defendant in the crime must be proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
II 
R 
R 329. 
Instruction 
'1'0 be an aider and abettor, one must share the criminal intent of the principaL 
these must be a community of purpose in the unJavvful undertaking. 
Instruction 25 
If you unanimously agree beyond a reasonable doubt that Jon Allen Kienholz is 
guilty of murder and you unanimously agree beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
state has proven that the murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated, and you 
unanimoLlsly agree beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, COREY SKU 
REID, aided and abetted in the commission of the willful, deliberate, and 
premeditated murder, you must find the defendant, COREY SKII REID, guilty of 
Aiding and Abetting First Degree Murder. 
If you unanimollsly agree beyond a reasonable doubt that Jon Allen Kienholz is 
guilty of murder hut you unanimously agree beyond a reasonahle doubt that the 
state has not proven that the murder was willful. deliberate, and premeditated, and 
you unanimously agree beyond a reavmablc doubt that the defendant. COREY 
SKU REID. aided and abetted in the commission of the murder. you must find tbe 
defendant. COR EY SKIl REID. guIlty ,\iding and Abetting Second Degree 
Munier. 
Nowhere do these instruction" rcqum~ the jury 10 find that Mr Reid shared the mental 
state of premeditation with Mr. Kienholz. Rather, when read carefully, the instructions make 
clear that Mr. Kienholz must have acted with premeditation. The instructions also make clear 
that Mr. Reid must have shared Mr. Kienholz's intent, which would be, of course, the intent to 
shoot the victims. See S'tate v. Porter. 142 Idaho 37 L 374, 128 P.3d 908.911 (2005)(lntent to 
kill is not a necessary element of murder). But. the instructions do not, in any way, state that Mr. 
Reid must have acted with the mental state o/" premeditation. This missing element denied Mr. 
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Reid his state and federal constitutIonal rights to due process and to ajury trial. Idaho Const. art. 
1, *~ 7 and 13, US Consl. Amends. 5, 6, and 14. 
2. Standard or Revieh' 
The defense did not object to the instructions helow. However the isslle of whether Mr. 
Reid's constitutional rights to due process and a jury trial were violated when the jury was not 
instructed as to premeditation is a matter of fundamental eITor which may addressed for the first 
time on appeal. 
At the time of the preparation of this hrief, the law of fundamental error is in flux. State 
V. Perr\", Idaho P.3d 2010 WL 2880156 (20 I 0), petitioll for rehearing 
pending, sets out a restatement of the law of fundamental error which it states is not to be applied 
retroactively. However, State 1'. Longesl, Idaho P.3d 2010 WL 3895346. 
decided Octoher 6.2010, without comment applies Perry retroactively. It remains to be seen 
whether the petition In Pe,.,T wiIl be ~ranted or whether a petition for rehearing will he filed in 
Longesl seeking some clarification. 
The pre-Perrr law of fundamental error. the la\\ which was in effect at the time Mr. Reid 
was tried, and according to the no-retroactivity statement of Perrr, the layv that should apply to 
Mr. Reid's case, is that fundamental error may be raised for the first time on appeal. 
Fundamental error is an eITor that "goes to the foundation or basis of a defendant's rights or to 
the foundation of the case or takers 1 from the defendant a right \vhich was essenti al to his defense 
and \vhich no court could or ought to permit him to waive." State I'. Knowlton, 123 Idaho 916, 
918,854 P.2d 259,261 (1993); State v. Bingham, 116 Idaho 415, 423. 776 P.2d 424. 432 (1989). 
Post-Perry fundamental eITOJ' law is as follows: 
13 
· .. In cases of unobjected to fundamental error ( I) the defendant mLlst 
demonstrate that one or more of the defendant's llnwaived constitLltional rights 
were violated; (2) the error must be clear or obviolls without the need for any 
additional Information as to whether the failure to object was H tactical decision: 
and (3) the defendant mllst demonstrate that the error affected the defendant's 
substantial rights, meaning (in most instances) that it must have affected the 
oLltcome of the trial proceedings. 
State v. Perry, at * 15. To demonstrate an effect upon the proceedings, the appellant mllst show 
a reasonable possibi lity that the error affected the outcome of the trial. Id. 
In this case, this Court need not determine whether Perry means what it says when it says 
that it is not to be applied retroactively, because under either pre- or post-Per!}' fundamental error 
Im\!, there was fundamental error in not instructing the jury on the mental state of premeditation 
required for conviction and the error requires reversal. 
3. Fllllda!llentall:.;rror Occurred 
Due process requires that the state prove every element of the charged offense by proof 
beyond a reasonahle doubt. In rc Winship, 397 U.S. 358,90 S. C1. 1068 (1970). Each c1emcnt of 
an offense must bc found by a properly instructed jury. Sec State \'. Olin, III Idaho 516,524-30, 
725 P.2d 801. 809-15 (Ct. App. 1986). 
To prove murder, the state must prove that the defendant acted with intent, specifically, 
malice aforethought. I.e. ~~ 18-4001, 18-4002. And, to prove first degree murder, as charged in 
this case. the state must prove not only malice, but also premeditation. I.e. ~ J8-4003(a). R 78-
80. 
l'v'lr. Reid was charged as an aider and abettor. I.e. § 18-204. To prove aiding and 
abetting the state is required to prove that the aider and abettor shared the mental state of the 
principal: there must be a community of purpose in the unlawful undertaking. State v. Scroggins, 
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110 Idaho 380, 386, 716 P.2d II ,1158 (1985), State v. Romero-Garcia, 139 Idaho 199,204, 
P.3d 1209, 1214 (Ct. App. 20(3). "[TJhe aider and abettor must have the requisite intent and 
have acted in some manner to bring about the intended result." State v. lv/itch ell, 146 Idaho 378, 
383, 195 P.3d 737, 742 (Ct. App. 2(08). This includes the mental state of premeditation for first 
degree murder. As set out in I Whmton's Criminal Law, Ch. 4, § 38: 
The absence of a mens rea precludes one from being an accomplice. Hence, a law 
enforcement officer or informer who feigns friendship or complicity in the 
commission of a crime in order to obtain incriminating evidence is not an 
accomplice. Similarly a person's mere presence at the time and place of the 
commission of a crime, or his knovvledge that a crime is being committed or is 
ahout to be committed. without more, docs not make him an accomplice. 
See also, State t·. ROTzdles, 1 17 Idaho 344, 787 P.2d I 152 (1990), overruled on other grounds, 
Slate v. f111l11plirers, 1341daho 657,8 P.3cl652 (2000). 
discllssed in Pcople I'. McCo\,. 25 CalAth 1111,24 PJd 1210 (Cal. 20(1). to support 
a finding of guilt for first degree murder on an aider and abettor theory, the prosecution may not 
rely on the mental statc of the actual perpetrator to support intent. malice or prcmeditation. 
[\ I \\ho aid, ' :lhet~; a LTimc is gui or thatcrinll' cven if someone 
committed some or all of the criminal acts. Because aiders and abettors may be 
criminally liable for acts not their ovvn cases have described their liability as 
vicariolls. This description is aCCllrate as far as it goes. But the aider and 
ahettor's guilt for the intended crime is not entirely vicarious. Rather, that guilt is 
based on a combination of the direct perpetrator's acts and the aider and abettor's 
OWI1 acts and own mental state. \Vhen a person, with the mental state necessary 
for an aider and abettor, helps or induces another to kill, that person's guilt is 
determined by the combined acts of all the patticipants as well as that person's 
own mens rea. The aider and abettor is liable for [his or1 her own mens rea, not 
the other person's. A defendant charged with murder or attempted murder cannot 
be held vicariously !table for the mens rea of an accomplice. 
25 Cal.4th at 1117,24 P.3d at 1216 (citations and internal quotations omitted, emphasis 
original). 
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The California Court states that each person's level of guilt '11oats free' not tied to the 
mental state or premeditation of the other. Cal.4th at 1121, P.3d at 1220, citing Dressler, 
Understandillg Crimina! Law, (2c! ed. 199:'i) * 3t)'()6(C), p. 4:'i0. In fact, the aic!er and abetter's 
guilt in homicide cases may be greater than that of the principle jf his or her mens rea is more 
culpable or may be less than the guilt of the principle, if his or her mens rea is less culpable. 
People v. McCoy, supra. 
In this case, the jury Vias instructed as to the criminal intent of malice aforethought. 
Instructions 19 and 20. And, the jury was instructed that to be guilty of first degree murder Mr. 
Kienholz must have acted Vvith premeditation. Instructions 17 and 18. But the Jury was never 
instructed that Mr. Reid, to be guilty of aiding and abetting, hac! to also share the mental state of 
premeditation. This was fundamental error that now requires reversal. Sfate v. PelT}', Sllpra. 
(I) Constitutional ViolatIOn. Mr. Reld's unwaived constitutional rights to due process 
and to a Jury trial \\ere \iolated. .\s set out above. the failure to instruct the jury that one of the 
clement of the charge against Mr. Reid vvas that he have the mental state of premeditation was a 
constitutional violation. Moreover, nowhere in the record is there any evidence of any sOl1 that 
NIl'. Reid waived his rights to due process. proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and a jury trial. 
(2) Clear error. The law, as discussed above, is clear that the absence of premeditation by 
Mr. Reid precludes conviction for aiding and abetting first degree murder. State v. Scroggins, 
sllpra, State v. ROllzem-Garcia. supra, State v. Mitchell, supra, People v. McCoy, supra. The law 
is also clear that a jury must be instructed as to every element of the offense. State v. Olin. 
supra. 
Clear error also requires a demonstration that the el1'or was not a result of a tactical 
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decision by the The record in this case does demonstrate that lack of proper instructions 
on the elements of the was not a result of a tactical decision. At trial, the defense offered 
to stipulate to of the elements of the charge. R 209, Notice of Indisputed Facts. The offer 
to stipulate included that on or about August 4,2008. in Shoshone County, Jon Allen Kienholz, 
Jr., willfully, unlawfully, deliberately, with premeditation and with malice, did kill and murder 
Neil Howard and Cynthia Bewick. /d. The proposed stipulation did not include any stipulation 
as to Mr. Reid's mental state. So, clearly, the defense disputed that element of the charge. 
Further, the defense was grounded upon the fact that the state had failed to prove that Mr. 
Reid shared the criminal intent of premeditation. Defense counsel's closing argument included 
the following: 
Your instructions that you have to find that Mr. Reid, to be guilty of this, had 
a combination of an act and an mtent. The acts are those things that are aiding 
and abetting, all those acts. And those all have to happen before the - and they 
have to be affirmative acts and they have to happen before the murder occurred. 
Not afterwards. And they have to be affirmative acts. Those are the - that's the 
act. 
But then it to be with in\\?nLith 1 intent 
someone's going to die. And then, by doing those acts with Jon Kienholz, that 
Mr. Reid joined Mr. Kienholz in a union, a meeting of the minds that "We are 
going to kill two people." And when did that occur? Your jury instructions say 
they have to have shared criminal intent. When did that happen? When did these 
two minds come together and they have a shared criminal intent? Even if you 
were to believe, which I'm asking you not to, everything that Kienholz, a liar. 
said. 
Hiram Wilson knew Kienholz through a pretty ShOl1 or rough period of time. 
Didn't think he was a very truthful person. I don't think Mr. Wood didn't think 
Mr. Kienholz was a truthful person. He lied to law enforcement when he needed 
to cover his butt. And so you need to pick out to convict Mr. Reid, you need to 
pick out something that Wilson or something that Kienholz said about the time 
that Kienholz decided, "These two people are going to die by my hand." And 
then that's Kienholz's intent. And you must also find that Mr. Reid had the same 
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idea and that he furthered that crime. ]\''1r. Kienholz had to have his intent as 
specific as your Jury instructions say. It had to be premeditated. And you have 
that defimtion. And it had to be with malice. Mr. Reid. in aiding and abetting this 
murder, to be guilty of first degree murder aiding and abetting would also have to 
have that same intent. premeditated and with malice. And that those two. if 
you're going to find him guilty of tbat, that those two minds. those two intents, 
would have to be shared by these two people, that they would have a community 
purpose for their undertaking. 
Tr. p. 730, In. 13 p. 732, In. 4 . 
. . . Jon Kienholz - much of the evidence you saw, especially the worst part of it. 
had to do with proving that Jon Kienholz was (sic) premeditated and had malice 
aforethought before he murdered these people. Now, his premeditation and 
malice aforethought, in the commission of the murder, is not the same. You need 
to find that happened, and you need to find Mr. Reiu had malice and 
premeditation in the iuea that Kienholz was going to go forward and kill these 
people .... He [Kienholz] clearly did pull the tri . And one version is that 
that's right when he made up his mind for the intent to kill, right at that moment. 
So if that were believable by you, you would also need to go to that point in time. 
and then Mr. Reid already (sic) come up with the idea and acted with the intent to 
have those people die that way. 
Tr. p. 738. In .. 1 - 21. 
The defense was mainly hased on the failure of the state to prove premeditation by Mr. 
Reid. And. dc counscl hcllc\cd that the instructions \\efl: SU \\orded as ll) require prunf uf 
premeditation by Mr. Reid inuependently of Mr. Kienho!z's state of mind. It is clear then, that 
the defense did not make a tactical decision to not lllstruct the jury that it had to find that Mr. 
Reid acted with premeditation. See iVfcKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567,225 P.2e! 700 (20 to). 
Rather, the lack of instruction on premeditation on the part of Mr. Reid was a result of 
inadvertence, not purpose by the defense. 
(3) Reasonable possibility that the elTor affected the outcome. As the defense set out in 
closing, the only evidence the state offered to support premeditation by Mr. Reid was the 
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testimony of Mr. Kienholz and Mr. Wilson. Mr. Kienholz was a self-admitted liar who told the 
state, "I'll testify to vvhatever you want" in retum for avoiding the death penalty. The jury may 
reasonably have rejected much or all of what Mr. Kienholz offered at trial. Likevvise, Mr. Wilson 
\vas testifying in order to gain a benefit from the state, and the jury could have reasonably 
rejected mllch of his testimony. In either of those events, given the lack of any evidence besides 
the testimony of these two of premeditation, it is reasonably possible that had the jury been 
instructed that it mllst find that Mr. Reid had the mental state of premeditation, it would not have 
convicted him of aiding and abetting two first degree murders. Moreover, it is certainly 
reasonably possible that one of the twelve jurors would have not been able to find by proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Reid acted with premeditation resulting in a hung jury. 
Conversely. the jury might ha\'e put more credence in Mr. Wilson's testimony than in Mr. 
Kienholz' s. Mr. Wilson testified that the \".hole situation seemed like ajoke and that he did not 
helie\e that \Ir. Reid. \VhOlll he kne\\ \\eIL could ever dt) anything like killing anyone. He also 
testified that as they \valked to the campsite, Mr. Reid was suggesting that they just leave,just 
steal the car and leme. This was probative of a lack of premeditation of murder on Mr. Reid's 
part very shortly before 1\'11'. Kienholz killed. If the jury had been properly instructed that it was 
required to find Mr. Reid acted with premeditation, it might reasonably have returned, based on 
Mr. Wilson's testimony, a different verdict. 
Because there was fundamental error in the failure to properly instruct the jury and 
because that elTor was not harmless, reversal is now required. State v. Perry, supra. 
B. The Erroneous Admission of Photographs Requires Reversal 
Reversal is required not only because of instructional elTor. In addition, the elTOneOllS 
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admission of certain photographic evidence requires reversal. 
I. Relevallt Facts 
Prior to trial, the defense moved to exclude certain photos. The grounds for exclusion 
included I) that the evidence \vas not relevant as it did not tend to make the existence of any fact 
of consequence more probabJe pursuant to IRE 401; 2) the prejudicial value of the e\'idence far 
outweighed any possible probative value under IRE 403; 3) the evidence was cumulative since 
there was no dispute as to the death of both victims by gunshot wounds: and 4) tbe photos were 
so highly prejudicial that curative instructions could not prevent predispositional eflect on the 
jury. R 162-163. In support of the motion, Mr. Reid offered to stipulate to the following: 1) 
That on or about the 4th dav of August. 2008, 2) lfl Shoshone County. ID; 3) Jon Allen Kienholz, 
-' L.- ~ ~ '" " 
Jr., wdlfully. unlawfully, deliberately. with premeditation and with malice; 4) killed and 
murdered Neil Howard and Cynthia Bewick. R 209 210 . 
. \t the argulllent Ull the motion, the defense pointed \Jut that the photographs ,vere terribly 
gruesome incn.:asing tl1c prejudicial impact. In thIS case, there was no need for the state to prove 
that a murder occurred, as that was conceded, and, e\el1 ignoring that concession, as Mr. 
Kienbolz was going to testify (and indeed did testify) that he shot Mr. HO\vard and Ms. Bewick. 
Therefore, the state did not need the photos to prove anything. The state did not need to prove 
the time or location of the deaths, the nature of the wOLlnds, or even that murder had occurred. 
The photos had 110 relevance to proving whether or not Mr. Reid aided and abetted in the killings 
as they demonstrated nothing about his presence or state of mind and were highly prejudicial. Tr. 
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4/23/09, p. In. 10 - p. 
While some photos were excluded, others were admitted. R 200-201. These included 
Plaintiff's Ex. 1 which shO\x,:s Mr. HO\vard's body on the ground. He is laying in a crucifix 
posture with his shirt pulled up around his neck and his very bloodied head slightly askew. The 
state's witness who presented this photo specifically told the jury that the photo depicted Mr. 
Howard "in a kind of cross position," . n. Tr. p. , In. 23 - p. 276, In. 9 . 
State's Exhibit is a particularly gruesome closeup photograph of Mr. Howard's face. 
A gunshot wound to his left temple is clearly visible and the top and left side of his head are 
covered in dried blood. His lips are parted and blood can be seen on his teeth. But, most 
gruesome are the maggot larvae and flies. The state's witness testified 'This shows the dried 
blackened blood on his face. You'll see the puncture wound located in his left temple right there. 
If you ~ you can see It better in the photograph. but you can see the small larvae that's forming on 
his teeth. And what the the riles come in and la\ on the soft tissues in the nose. the eyes. 
the mOLlth, the ears." Ex. Tr. p. 279. In. 7 - 14. 
Exhibit is a similarly gruesome closeup photograph of Ms. Bewick's face. As the 
prosecutor stated to the jury. is a rather graphic photo. I believe." Tr. p. 282, In. 18 - 19. 
I All of the photos subject to the motion in limine and later admitted at trial were shown 
at the hearing on the motion in limine. See, Tr. p. 28 - p. 99. Those photos are in the record 
hefore this Court WIth the numbers they were assigned at trial, which differ from the numbers 
assigned at the hearing on the motion in limine. For clarity, this brief refers to the photos by the 
exhibit numbers assigned at tlial. The appellate record included all the photos admitted at trial. 
To ensure a complete record, Mr. Reid has also filed a motion to augment the appellate record 
with the photos as made a part of the record at the motion in limine. See Tr. p. 97, In. 23 - p. 98, 
In. 18. Therefore. the record will contain each of the disputed photos twice - once from when 
each was subject to the motion in limine, and once from when each was entered as an exhibit at 
trial. 
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Apparently, the prosecutor made this statement so that certain people could be alerted to leave 
the coul1room to avoid viewing it. Tr. p. 282, In. 20 23. The state's witness, Detective 
Morgan, testi fied: 
Tr. p. 
27 shows a c lose-up of Ci ndy Bewick's face as as it was located on the scene. 
You'll see the bloody sweatshirt with blood around her head area. You'll see the 
- the pupae, where it's beyond the before the maggot stage and prior to laying 
the This is the same thing. But this is where they were how they eat the 
blood, and then they - and also the soft tissue prior to becoming flies. You can 
also see a -located right there you can see a puncture yvound that appeared to be 
maybe a gunshot wound right there on her left. 
And YOL(ll see again with the she was laying more in the shade than in the 
bright sunlight, which is which is why her face has more insect activity than 
Neal's did at this particular time. He was pretty much in the sunlight, when the 
sLln came tip. and she was in the shady areas. And you can also see that note 
that the surface animals the crows. the coyotes - ha\'e not eaten the soft tissue 
like the lips and the eyes. which is \\here they go for. which is what they eat first. 
That would also indicate that she hadn't been there but just several days. 
In. - p. 28'+. In. :'i. 
2. Arglllnelll 
Three particularly disturbing photographs were erroneously admitted at trial. The error in 
admitting these photos requires a new trial. 
State's Exhibit 17 shows M1'. Howard laying on the ground in a "a kind of cross position" 
The position of Mr. Howard's body with his arms extended straight out, his Sh111 pulled up to 
expose his torso. his Sh0l1s rolled up to just cover his genitals, and his hloodied head lying askew 
resting on his len arm is nearly identical to the depiction of Christ in tens of thousands of 
crucifixes and paintings. The pose is nearly identical to poses used in posters to advertise Mel 
Gibson's Passion of the Christ. Detective Morgan's testimony ensured that the jury would not 
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miss this symbolism and feel deeply seated religious emotion when viewing the photo. 
State's Exhibit is a closeup of Mr. tloward's face and shows not only his injuries, but 
also "insect activity" including larvae in his teeth. And. Exhibit was so disturbing that the 
prosecutor warned those watching the trial that they might wish to leave. It is a closeup of Cindy 
Bewick's face. Her mouth is eovered with insects eating her. 
The law regarding the admission of the photographs is set out in State v. Phillips, 117 
Idaho 609, 611-l 790 P.2d 392-93 (Ct. App. 1990): 
Generally, photographs of a victim in a prosecution for homicide are, in the 
discretion of the trial COUlt, admissible as evidence as an aid to the jury in arriving 
at a fair understanding of the evidence, proof of the corpus deliciti, extent of 
injury, condition and identification of the body, or for their bearing on the 
question of degree or atrociousness of the crimes, even though such photographs 
may have the additional effect of tending to excite the emotions of the jury. Once 
the trial judge determines the relevancy of a photograph, he or she must decide 
whether its probative value is substantially outweighed by any inflammatory 
effect. Absent an abuse of discretion. the trial court's decisIOn regarding 
admission of sLlch photographs will not be chsturbed on appeal. 
Id. (citations omitted). See also, Slate 1' . .','([17("17(':::. [47 Idaho L 525. 211 P.3c! 130. 134 (Ct. 
While photos of the victim are generally admissible, in this case. the three photos 
discLlssed above should not have been admitted because even if they were relevant, their 
probative vaille \\'as substantially outweighed by inflammatory effect. Id. 
The probative value of the photos was at best minimal. The fact of a murder was never in 
dispute. Neither was the identity of Mr. Hmvard and Ms. Bewick. The time of death and the 
method of death were never in dispute. All was admitted by Mr. Reid and all was testified to by 
Mr. Kienholz and Mr. Wilson. The only question in dispute was whether Mr. Reid aided and 
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abetted Mr. Kienholz in committing the crimes, m pal1icular whether he shared the mel1S rea of 
premeditation. And, not one of these photographs contained any image that would shed any light 
on that question. These three photos gave the jury no evidence that had "any tendency to make 
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable 
or less probable than it \vOLIId be without the evidence." IRE 401. 
Yet, the prejudicial effect was enormous. It is difficult to imagine more powerfully 
persuasive imagery than a photo of a murder victim laid out like Christ on the cross - persuasive 
not for purposes of encouraging jurors to carefully weigh evidence and reach a fact based verdict, 
but persuasive to avenge a death that has a cultural meaning beyond the death of a single human 
being. 
Similarly. the photographs of Mr. Howard and Ms. Bewick being eaten by insects evoke 
powerful emotions. 
Ckarh the pr\)bati\t~ value of these photographs \\C1S substantially outweighed by the 
II1flammatory effect and their admission was an abuse of discretion. State v. Phillips, supra, IRE 
403. 
A similar result was reached in Phillips. In that case, the Court of Appeals held that a 
photo of a victim's scalp lying in the snow on the side of the road should not have been admitted 
in a vehicular manslaughter prosecution. The Court, in deciding the photo should not have been 
allowed. wrote, 'Tbis photograph had no probative value, but carried with it some prejudicial 
impact not necessary to prove the manslaughter charges ... " 117 Idaho at 612,790 P.2d at 393 
(emphaSIS original). 
An Arizona case presents facts very close to those in this case. In State v. Spreitz, 190 
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Ariz. 129,945 P.2d 1260 (Ariz. 1(97), the state Supreme Court held that the trial court abused its 
discretion in admItting in a murder prosecLltion photographs of the victim's body as it appeared 
after decomposing in the desert for three days. The Court noted that the body was discolored and 
insects were shO\vn pattly covering it. The Court said that the insect activity was vividly 
apparent in the close-ups. In balancing probative value against prejudicial effect, the Arizona 
court noted that the medical examiner had testified clearly about wounds to the victim's body and 
that the photos therefore presented little or no advantage to proving matters in dispute. 
The photos as described in ,)'preitz. are very similar to the photos admitted in this case. In 
both cases, the photos are of bodies which were exposed to the elements and were at the time of 
the photos subject to vivid insect activity. And, as in S'preitz., the photos in this case provided 
little advantage to the jury in understanding any issue in dispute. Yet they were highly 
prejudiCIal and should havc bccn excluded. IRE: 403. Swte \'. Phillips. supra: Slate l' . . '>]Jreitz., 
SlIpr([. 
The qucstion thcn becomes whether the eITor was harmless. State l'. Phillips, supra. The 
error IS harmlcss only if this Court finds that the state has established beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the \'erdict \vould have been the same without the photographs. Id. 
The error is not harmless because the state cannot meet this burden. 
While there was no doubt that Mr. Kienholz murdered Mr. Howard and Ms. Bewick, as 
discusscd ab()\'c. the evidence of that murder alone did not support the aiding and abetting 
charges against ;VIr. Reid. The state had no evidence independent of its dubious and inconsistent 
accomplice testimony to prove the requisite mental state, premeditation, by Mr. Reid. It cannot 
be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the verdict would have been the same without the 
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erroneously admitted photos. [d. 
Because It cannot be established beyond a reasonable doubt that the verdict would have 
been the same vvithout the erroneously admitted photographs, reversal is required. 
1. Relevant Facts 
At sentencing, the defense and state to use a presentence investigation report (PSI) 
prepared for a 2008 conviction for possession of a controlled substance. Tr. p. 758, In. 2 7, p. 
786, In, 18 20, That PSI is an exhibit on appeal. R 404. 
That PSI repolted a minimal criminal history. Mr. Reid, vvho was 21 at the time of 
sentencing, had two prior offenses of tobacco possession/distribution/use by a minor, two alcohol 
possessIOn by a rmnor. a failure to provide proof of insurance and failure to register a vehicle, a 
possession of drug paraphernalia, and a driv 
offense convictions, PSI p. 3 4. 
under the influence. He had no prior violent 
,\ court uation al is ill the un 
appeaL R 404. That evaluation found that Mr. Reid alcohol . amphetamine 
dependence. cannabis dependence, and cocaine dependence. Ex. Evaluation from Alliance 
Fami I)' Services, p. 1 
The day of sentencing, the state filed "Documentation in SUppOlt of State's Sentencing 
Recommendation." R 354 378. Based upon this documentation, the state asked for a sentence 
of life with 40 years fixed. a greater sentence than \vas Imposed 011 Mr. Kienholz. Tr. p. 763, In. 
23 p. 768, In. 11, p. 784, In. 1 4. 
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The state's documentation was a "draft" Idaho State Police Report which included the 
transcript of an unsvvorn interview between Detective Morgan, a deputy prosecuting attorney, and 
Ronald Rollins, Jr., conducted on January 2009. R 357. (Mr. Reid's trial \vas held in May 
2009.) This interview was highly damaging to Mr. Reid. 
There is nothing in this interview to establish Mr. Rollins's credibility or his motivations 
other than the fact that he was released from jail early by his probation officer. R 368. All that is 
revealed is that he was in jail for some undisclosed period of time on a probation violation and 
that he said that he shared a cell \vith Mr. Reid for about a month. R. 357, 371. In the interview, 
it is not even clear Mr. Rollins is relating information he claims Mr. Reid shared with him 
directly or whether he is just repo11ing jailhouse rumors. R 357 378. 
However, Mr. Rollins' interview is highly inconsistent with the evidence the state 
presented at Mr. Reid's trial. For example, Mr. Rollins claims that Mr. Reid said that Mr. 
Wilsoll kIcked ;\Is. Bewick in the face so that herjaw was 011 to the side and that she pulled Ollt 
her 0\\11 haIr. R.361. Later. Mr. Rollins claims that Mr. Reid changed his story and said that he 
had "stepped on" Ms. Bewick's face. R. 362. Yet, at trial, there ,vas no evidence presented either 
that Ms. Bewick' s jaw was dislocated or that her hair had been pulled out. Rather. .tv!r. Kienholz 
and Mr. Wilson both testified that Mr. Kienholz kicked Ms. Be\vick. Tr. p. 438, In. 24 p.439, 
In. 3, p. 536, In. 15 21. 
Likewise, Mr. Rollins claims that Mr. Reid told him that "they," apparently he and Mr. 
Kienholz, had tried to get a gun before they traded Luke Hill for a gun and had been th\varted in 
their efforts when a friend's father caught them trying to get into a locked gun safe. Further, 
according to Mr. Rollins. before they got the gun from Mr. Hill, "they" went to Jared Coe's 
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hOllse and "something happened there. R.364. Yet at the trial, there was no evidence presented 
that an earlier attempt to get a gun had been thwarted or anything about Jared Coe or something 
happening at his house. 
Also, and most imp0l1antly, Mr. Rollins claimed that Mr. Reid and Mr. Kienholz's 
motive was to steal Mr. Howard's car for their road trip because Mr. Howard refused to give 
them the car voluntarily. R 364, 365,373, 376. This motive was not the motive the state 
presented at trial. Instead, at trial, the state's evidence was that the motive was to respond to 
threats Mr. Hmvard and Ms. Bewick had made to Ms. Purtill. No evidence at all was provided 
to support a moti ve of auto theft. 
Mr. Rollins also claimed, contrary to the evidence the state presented at triaL that Mr. 
Reid and Mr. Kienholz had planned the murders for two days. R 364-65. Later, he claims that 
Mr. Reid said that they had planned the murder for "two, three, several days." R 370. Yet at 
tnaL the state's v:itness, Mr. Kienholz testified that the murders were planned on the same day 
that they \vere completed. 
During the interview, tvlr. Rollins claims that not only did J\'lr. Reid confess to aiding and 
abetting, but that he believed that he \vould get off with just probation, that he thought what had 
happened at the pass was funny, that he had no remorse, and that he said that Mr. Howard and 
Ms. Bewick were "punks" for not giving him and Mr. Kienholz the car and therefore they shot 
them. R 359, 361, 364, 365, 376. 
At the close of the interview, Mr. Rollins vouched for his own credibility. He agreed 
with Detective Morgan that the detective had come to him unexpectedly early the Sunday before 
and that they had set up this formal interview. Mr. RoIlins said, ''I'm glad it happened that way, 
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better that way. You guys know my credibility is more, if I'd known you guys were coming for a 
couple of weeks that person could have, you know, been trying to weasel there (sic) way out or .. 
. I knew a lot of the events and I couldn't have known unless I talked to Corey." R 378. Earlier 
in the interview. Mr. Rollins said, "1 got out of jail early, but I was asked if I would testify before 
anything to the jail was brought up." R 368. 
Defense counsel objected to consideration of the Rollins interview. Counsel stated: 
The ~ I don't \vant to dwell on this Ronnie Rollins, but it's ~ it's disgusting. I 
think it's very poor form to bring that up today. I think it's inflammatory, and I 
think it's insulting to the families here today. Ronald Rollins doesn't have little 
credibility he has no credibility while giving the statement in jail to get out of 
jaIl. None of the things he said was corroborated by Jon Kienholz or Hiram 
Wilson there. None of it happened. And I think it's very poor form to bring that 
up today. If s a complete lie and fabrication, inconsistent \\'ith every statement of 
every witness that's recorded in this case, including Mr. Reid's earliest statement. 
And it was all for a pica arrangement WIth Mr. Rollins that never materialized 
from thc State. 
Tr. P. no. In. 17 - p. I. In. :). 
The COLIrt considered this objection, but determined to rely on the Rollins interview, at 
And Mr Smith quite properly has pointed out that \ve have nothing to judge the 
credibility of Mr. Rollins. He's not here. He's not subject to cross-examination. 
And I recognize that and recognize that, without live testimony and cross-
examination, the statements should be taken with a grain of salt 
But one thing that occurred to me, as I was looking through the statements, was 
that the statements were made prior to the trial or any real discussion of the facts 
of the case. And Mr. Rollins did have a good knowledge of the facts of the case 
based upon what he stated that Mr. Reid had told him while they were in jail 
together. And so, recognizing that he was not subject to cross-examination, there 
is some evidence just from the statements, themselves, that they do have an 
element of credibility because he has details that would not have been known to 
him except had they been given him by Mr. Reid, as he stated. And I'm referring 
there to elements that ~ or detai Is of the facts that came out during the trial. 
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Tr. p. In. p. 789, In. 19. 
In addition to the Rollins interviev" the Court stated that it was going to consider 
statements made at the Kienholz sentencing. 
The murders have had a tremendous effect on the Bewick and Howard families 
and the friends of the victims, as shown by the statement of Ms. Carpenter and the 
testimony that was presented at trial and the statements that were made at the 
Kienholz sentencing. r recall those statements very well. So, there's a 
tremendous effect naturally upon the families of the victims. 
Tr. p. 788, In. 1 8. 
After considering this information and arguments from counsel, and Mr. Reid's statement 
that he did not do enough to stop the crimes from happening and that he \vas very sorry, the 
Court sentenced Mr. Reid to life with 30 years fixed, the same sentence imposed on Mr. 
Kienholz. Tr. p. 786, In. 9 12; p. 790, In. 18 - p. 791, In. I. 
2. Argument 
\Vhile the Idaho Rules or Evidence do not apply tt) sentencing hearings, IRE 101 )(3) 
and lCR 32(3), a defendant clearly has a due process right not to be sentenced on the basis of 
materially incorrect information. United S'/ates \". Peltv, 982 F.2d 1365, 1369 (9th Cir. 1993). 5'ee 
also, State v. ;Ho len , 148 Idaho 950, 961, 231 P.3d 1047, 1058 (Cl. App. 2010). The due 
process clause of the United States Constitution requires that defendants not be sentenced based 
on "misinformation of constitutional magnitude." United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447, 92 
S.Ct. 489, 492 (1972); see also Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349. 358,97 S.Ct. 1197, 1205 
(plurality) (due process applies during sentencing), United States v. PettI', supra. See also, State 
v. Molen, supra (conjecture and speculation have no place in a presentence report). Material 
information is "unreliable" if it "lacks 'some minimal indicia of reliabi lity beyond mere 
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allegation.'" United States v. Iharra, F.2d 827 (9,h Cir. 1(84)(quoting United 5'tates v. 
Baylin, 696F.2d 1030, 1040 Cir. 1(82)). See also, State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 1,275, 1 
P.3d 299, 202 (CL App. 2(00) stating that hearsay must be disregarded at sentencing if there is 
no reasonable basis to deem it reliable, as where tbe information is simply conjecture. 
In this case, consideration of the Rollins intervie,v at sentencing violated stale and federal 
guarantees of due process. It was entirely hearsay and did not bear even minimal indicia of 
reliability. In that, it ,vas like the material which ,vas erroneously considered by the sentencing 
court in State v. Mauro, 121 Idaho 178,824 P.2d 109 (1991). The Supreme Court vacated the 
sentence in Mauro after the district court considered statements in the PSI suggesting the 
defendant's participation in a major drug distribution organization. Much of the information 
came from the fi les of the United States Attorney's office The Supreme Court noted that the 
fact that much of the information came from the U.S. Attorney's office did not make it per se 
reliable and \\ithout other indici~l of reliahility. the iilformatiol1 contained too much speculation 
and conjecture and too little support and should not have heen considered at sentencing. 121 
Idaho at 183. 824 P.2d at 114, 
In this case, like MUllro, the improper information came from gove1l1ment files III 
Mauro, the files of the U.S. Atto1l1ey; in this case, the files of the police and prosecutor. And, as 
in Mauro, that does not mean the information was per se reliable. 
Further, as in Mauro, there was no information by \\hich to find the gove1l1ment's 
informant credible. There is nothing in this case by which to find that Ml'. Rollins was either a 
reliable observer or an honest reporter. To the contrary, all that is known about him is that he 
was in jail and that he was released early from jail apparently in connection with his interView, 
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But, unlike lv/allro, and more ously than lv/auro, there were indications that Mr. 
Rollins was not credible. As set out above, his statements \vere in very large part inconsistent 
with the evidence presented at trial. 
The district court did note the complete lack of information to allow it to judge the 
credibility of Mr. Rollins. But, then the judge stated that he would consider the interview 
because it occurred to him that the interview took place before the trial and that Mr. Rollins had a 
"good knowledge of the facts of the case." This conclusion is debatable as Mr. Rollins' version 
of events was often at odds with the case the state presented. And, it is logically unsound. The 
LlCt that Mr. Rollins had some 1l1formation about the case, most of which was contradicted by the 
evidence presented at trial, does not support a conclusion that the interview provided reliable 
information. The interview was nothing but hearsay from a completely unknown source. That 
sort of hearsay that cannot be considered in sentencing without violating the state and kderal 
constitutional rights to due process. '<;tille ,'. l'v/ollm, supm, United States 1'. Pell\', supra. 
Based upon this error, the sentence mLlst 110\V be vacated and the case remanded for 
resentenc1l1g. ,)'wrc l'. :Yjallf'O, supra. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The convictions in this case must be reversed because the jUly was not instructed as to the 
required /!lens rea. The convictions must also be reversed because of the elToneous admission of 
photographs. 
In the alternative. the sentence must be vacated and the case remanded because it was 
based upon unreliable hearsay. 
Respectfully submitted this 14~y of October, 2010. 
Deborah Whipple 
Attorneys for Corey 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this l qcf1 day of October 2010, caused two true and 
coned copies of the foregoing document to be placed in the United States mail, postage prepaid, 
addressed to: 
Idaho Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-00 I 0 
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